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CIVIL PROCEDURE-PROCESS-IMMUNITY FROM SERVICE OF NONRESIDENT 
ENTERING STATE To Discuss SETTLEMENT OF A DISPUTE-Defendant, a resi-
dent of Idaho, leased a service station in Idaho from plaintiff, a Utah corpo-
ration. Plaintiff's attorney travelled to Idaho to attempt settlement of diffi-
culties which had arisen concerning the lease. When the Idaho negotiations 
failed, plaintiff invited defendant to make further attempts at settlement in 
Utah. Defendant accepted the proposal and, when the Utah negotiations 
proved unfruitful, defendant was served with process in Utah at plaintiff's 
request.1 It was undisputed that defendant went to Utah solely to effect 
settlement, returning directly to Idaho after cessation of negotiations. On 
appeal from the trial court's denial of defendant's motion to quash service, 
held, reversed, one judge dissenting. Actual fraudulent intent in in-
ducing a defendant to enter a state is not necessary to invalidate service 
of process on such defendant. When defendant was invited into the state 
to discuss settlement of a dispute and came for that sole purpose, he was 
not subject to service of civil process in the absence of notice by the party 
extending the invitation that he would be served with process if the at-
tempted settlement failed. Western States Refining Co. v. Berry, (Utah 
1957) 313 P. (2d) 480. 
It is a well-established rule in American courts that nonresident wit-
nesses who enter a state to testify at the trial of an action are immune from 
service of civil process while attending court and for a reasonable time 
before and after court attendance, while going to and returning from 
the place of trial.2 The immunity has been granted almost uniformly to 
1 Although not mentioned in the opinion, it is probable that service was issued 
incident to the same dispute which had given rise to the settlement negotiations. 
2 Chittenden v. Carter, 82 Conn. 585, 74 A. 884 (1909). 
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nonresident suitors as well.3 Although other arguments are given in 
support of the privilege,4 the traditional explanation rests on the public 
policy that the proper administration of justice requires that the cause be 
presented without interference5 and that the voluntary attendance 
of nonresident parties and witnesses be encouraged by granting them the 
immunity.6 It is frequently repeated that the privilege, established to aid 
courts in the administration of justice and of benefit only incidentally 
to individuals, is to be extended or withheld only as judicial necessities 
require; 7 and being in derogation of every creditor's right to subject the 
debtor to suit wherever he is found, it should not be extended beyond 
the reason on which it is founded.8 Despite a persuasive contrary current of 
opinion, many courts have included nonresident attorneys within the 
immunity.9 The privilege has been further enlarged to embrace non-
residents attending any judicial proceeding, whether in or out of court, 
involving the examination of issues of fact.10 Thus, the privilege has been 
granted to a nonresident party attending the taking of depositions,U a 
hearing before a commissioner in bankruptcy,12 and a pretrial examin-
ation.13 Application of the immunity to these proceedings may be justified 
in that it encourages the full rendition of the evidence by persons who 
in any event will be immune when the trial begins. However, in proceedings 
not involving issues of fact peculiarly within the parties' knowledge, where 
their presence cannot be considered necessary to the administration of 
justice, persons have been granted immunity on the theory that the 
privilege has become a substantive one of the individual, as well as one 
for the protection of the administration of justice.14 Thus, nonresident 
s Diamond v. Earle, 217 Mass. 499, 105 N.E. 363 (1914); Stewart v. Ramsay, 242 U.S. 
128, 37 S. Ct. 44 (1916). Two jurisdictions do not grant the privilege to parties, even 
though they are also witnesses. Baldwin v. Emerson, 16 R.I. 304, 15 A. 83 (1888); Guynn 
v. McDaneld, 4 Idaho 606, 43 P. 74 (1895). In Connecticut defendants are immune but 
plaintiffs are not. Bishop v. Vose, 27 Conn. 1 (1858); Ryan v. Ebecke, 102 Conn. 12, 128 A. 
14 (1925). 
4 Finucane v. Warner, 194 N.Y. 160, 86 N.E. 1118 (1909) (necessary to maintain the 
dignity of the court); Stewart v. Ramsay, note 3 supra (courts of justice ought to be open). 
6 Lamb v. Schmitt, 285 U.S. 222, 52 S. Ct. 317 (1932). 
6 Matthews v. Tufts, 87 N.Y. 568 (1882); Page Co. v. MacDonald, 261 U.S. 446, 43 
S. Ct. 416 (1923). Keeffe and Roscia, "Immunity and Sentimentality," 32 CORN L. Q. 471 
(1947). 
7 Brooks v. State ex rel. Richards, 26 Del. (3 Boyce) 1, 79 A. 790 (1911); Long v. 
Ansell, 293 U.S. 76 (1934). 
s Hardie v. Bryson, (E.D. Mo. 1942) 44 F. Supp. 67. 
9 Williams v. Hatcher, 95 S.C. 49, 78 S.E. 615 (1913); Durst v. Tautges, Wilder & 
McDonald, (7th Cir. 1930) 44 F. (2d) 507. Contra, State ex rel. Johnson v. Tautges, Rerat 
& Welch, 146 Neb. 439, 20 N.W. (2d) 232 (1945). 
10 Durst v. Tautges, note 9 supra. 
11 Roschynialski v. Hale, (D.C. Neb. 1913) 201 F. 1017. 
12 Matthews v. Tufts, note 6 supra. 
13 New England Industries, Inc. v. Margiotti, 296 N.Y. 722, 70 N.E. (2d) 540 (1946). 
14 Murrey v. Murrey, 216 Cal. 707, 16 P. (2d) 741 (1932). 
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parties present to attend argument on demurrer15 and to attend pro-
ceedings before an appellate court16 have been held immune. There is 
authority that the rule may even be extended to apply ~o a nonresident 
entering a state to commence an action.17 While even these decisions seem 
to extend the privilege beyond the reason on which it was founded, to 
hold, as in the principal case, that immunity embraces persons enter-
ing a state to settle matters which might become the subject of litigation 
lacks reason or authority.18 In situations similar to that in the principal case 
the question of immunity shades off into whether service should be set aside 
as having been fraudulently procured by enticement of the nonresident into 
the state for the purpose of service of process.19 It is frequently difficult to 
determine from the decisions whether immunity is being granted or fraudu-
lently procured service of process set aside.20 The court in the principal 
case, while citing a decision in which immunity was granted on the basis 
of the policy of encouraging settlement of disputes,21 uses language22 
and cites other cases which suggest it is thinking in terms of fraud. The 
suggestion that the party extending the invitation has a duty to warn the 
nonresident that process will be served upon him should the negotiations 
fail is novel and questionable. Since no fraud was found by the trial court, 
the decision in the principal case stands for an unwarranted extension 
of the immunity rule. 
Edward M. Heppenstall 
15 Kinne v. Lant, (E.D. Mich. 1895) 68 F. 436. 
16 Chase National Bank v. Turner, 269 N.Y. 397, 199 N.E. 636 (1936). 
17 Franklin v. Superior Court, 98 Cal. App. (2d) 292, 220 P. (2d) 8 (1950) (privilege 
denied because controlling purpose in entering state was not to commence litigation). 
18 Vaughn v. Boyd, 142 Ga. 230, 82 S.E. 576 (1914); Lingo v. Reichenbach Land Co., 
225 Iowa 112, 279 N.W. 121 (1938). 
19 Lingo v. Reichenbach Land Co., note 18 supra, at 117. See also annotation, 93 
A.L.R. 872 (1934). 
20 Allen v. Wharton, 59 Hun (N.Y.) 622, 13 N.Y.S. 38 (1891); Olean Street R. Co. v. 
Fairmount Construction Co., 55 App. Div. 292, 67 N.Y.S. 165 (1900). 
21 State ex rel. Ellan v. District Court, 97 Mont. 160, 33 P. (2d) 526 (1934). 
22 Principal case at 481: "It is our opinion that •.• equity and good conscience will 
not permit plaintiff to take sharp advantage of defendant's presence .•.• " 
